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DOCUMENT 1
Hillary Emails Reveal True Motive for Libya Intervention
Newly disclosed emails show that Libya’s plan to create a gold-backed currency to compete with the euro and dollar was a motive for NATO’s intervention.
T
he New Year’s Eve release of over 3,000 new Hillary Clinton emails from the State Department has CNN abuzz over gossipy text messages, the “who gets to ride with Hillary” selection process set up by her staff, and how a “cute” Hillary photo fared on Facebook.
But historians of the 2011 NATO war in Libya will be sure to notice a few of the truly explosive confirmations contained in the new emails: admissions of rebel war crimes, special ops trainers inside Libya from nearly the start of protests, Al Qaeda embedded in the U.S. backed opposition, Western nations jockeying for access to Libyan oil, the nefarious origins of the absurd Viagra mass rape claim, and concern over Gaddafi’s gold and silver reserves threatening European currency.
Hillary’s Death Squads
A March 27, 2011, intelligence brief [archived here] on Libya, sent by long time close adviser to the Clintons and Hillary’s unofficial intelligence gatherer, Sidney Blumenthal, contains clear evidence of war crimes on the part of NATO-backed rebels. Citing a rebel commander source “speaking in strict confidence” Blumenthal reports to Hillary [emphasis mine]:
Under attack from allied Air and Naval forces, the Libyan Army troops have begun to desert to the rebel side in increasing numbers. The rebels are making an effort to greet these troops as fellow Libyans, in an effort to encourage additional defections.
(Source Comment: Speaking in strict confidence, one rebel commander stated that his troops continue to summarily execute all foreign mercenaries captured in the fighting…).
While the illegality of extra-judicial killings is easy to recognize (groups engaged in such are conventionally termed “death squads”), the sinister reality behind the “foreign mercenaries” reference might not be as immediately evident to most.
While over the decades Gaddafi was known to make use of European and other international security and infrastructural contractors, there is no evidence to suggest that these were targeted by the Libyan rebels.
There is, however, ample documentation by journalists, academics, and human rights groups demonstrating that black Libyan civilians and sub-Saharan contract workers, a population favored by Gaddafi in his pro-African Union policies, were targets of “racial cleansing” by rebels who saw black Libyans as tied closely with the regime.[1]
Black Libyans were commonly branded as “foreign mercenaries” by the rebel opposition for their perceived general loyalty to Gaddafi as a community and subjected to torture, executions, and their towns “liberated” by ethnic cleansing. This is demonstrated in the most well-documented example of Tawergha, an entire town of 30,000 black and “dark-skinned” Libyans which vanished by August 2011 after its takeover by NATO-backed NTC Misratan brigades.
These attacks were well-known as late as 2012 and often filmed, as this report from The Telegraph confirms:
After Muammar Gaddafi was killed, hundreds of migrant workers from neighboring states were imprisoned by fighters allied to the new interim authorities. They accuse the black Africans of having been mercenaries for the late ruler. Thousands of sub-Saharan Africans have been rounded up since Gaddafi fell in August.
It appears that Clinton was getting personally briefed on the battlefield crimes of her beloved anti-Gaddafi fighters long before some of the worst of these genocidal crimes took place.
Al-Qaeda and Western Special Forces Inside Libya
The same intelligence email from Sydney Blumenthal also confirms what has become a well-known theme of Western supported insurgencies in the Middle East: the contradiction of special forces training militias that are simultaneously suspected of links to Al Qaeda.
Blumenthal relates that “an extremely sensitive source” confirmed that British, French, and Egyptian special operations units were training Libyan militants along the Egyptian-Libyan border, as well as in Benghazi suburbs.
While analysts have long speculated as to the “when and where” of Western ground troop presence in the Libyan War, this email serves as definitive proof that special forces were on the ground only within a month of the earliest protests which broke out in the middle to end of February 2011 in Benghazi.
By March 27 of what was commonly assumed a simple “popular uprising” external special operatives were already “overseeing the transfer of weapons and supplies to the rebels” including “a seemingly endless supply of AK47 assault rifles and ammunition.”
Yet only a few paragraphs after this admission, caution is voiced about the very militias these Western special forces were training because of concern that, “radical/terrorist groups such as the Libyan Fighting Groups and Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are infiltrating the NLC and its military command.”
The Threat of Libya’s Oil and Gold to French Interests
Though the French-proposed U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 claimed the no-fly zone implemented over Libya was to protect civilians, an April 2011 email [archived here] sent to Hillary with the subject line “France’s client and Qaddafi’s gold” tells of less noble ambitions.
The email identifies French President Nicholas Sarkozy as leading the attack on Libya with five specific purposes in mind: to obtain Libyan oil, ensure French influence in the region, increase Sarkozy’s reputation domestically, assert French military power, and to prevent Gaddafi’s influence in what is considered “Francophone Africa.”
Most astounding is the lengthy section delineating the huge threat that Gaddafi’s gold and silver reserves, estimated at “143 tons of gold, and a similar amount in silver,” posed to the French franc (CFA) circulating as a prime African currency. In place of the noble sounding “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) doctrine fed to the public, there is this “confidential” explanation of what was really driving the war [emphasis mine]:
This gold was accumulated prior to the current rebellion and was intended to be used to establish a pan-African currency based on the Libyan golden Dinar. This plan was designed to provide the Francophone African Countries with an alternative to the French franc (CFA).
(Source Comment: According to knowledgeable individuals this quantity of gold and silver is valued at more than $7 billion. French intelligence officers discovered this plan shortly after the current rebellion began, and this was one of the factors that influenced President Nicolas Sarkozy’s decision to commit France to the attack on Libya.)
Though this internal email aims to summarize the motivating factors driving France’s (and by implication NATO’s) intervention in Libya, it is interesting to note that saving civilian lives is conspicuously absent from the briefing.
Instead, the great fear reported is that Libya might lead North Africa into a high degree of economic independence with a new pan-African currency.
French intelligence “discovered” a Libyan initiative to freely compete with European currency through a local alternative, and this had to be subverted through military aggression.
The Ease of Floating Crude Propaganda
Early in the Libyan conflict Secretary of State Clinton formally accused Gaddafi and his army of using mass rape as a tool of war. Though numerous international organizations, like Amnesty International, quickly debunked these claims, the charges were uncritically echoed by Western politicians and major media.
It seemed no matter how bizarre the conspiracy theory, as long as it painted Gaddafi and his supporters as monsters, and so long as it served the cause of prolonged military action in Libya, it was deemed credible by network news.
Two foremost examples are referenced in the latest batch of emails: the sensational claim that Gaddafi issued Viagra to his troops for mass rape, and the claim that bodies were “staged” by the Libyan government at NATO bombing sites to give the appearance of the Western coalition bombing civilians.
In a late March 2011 email [WikiLeaks copy here], Blumenthal confesses to Hillary that,
I communicated more than a week ago on this story—Qaddafi placing bodies to create PR stunts about supposed civilian casualties as a result of Allied bombing—though underlining it was a rumor. But now, as you know, Robert gates gives credence to it. (See story below.)
Sources now say, again rumor (that is, this information comes from the rebel side and is unconfirmed independently by Western intelligence), that Qaddafi has adopted a rape policy and has even distributed Viagra to troops. The incident at the Tripoli press conference involving a woman claiming to be raped is likely to be part of a much larger outrage. Will seek further confirmation.
Not only did Defense Secretary Robert Gates promote his bizarre “staged bodies” theory on CBS News’ “Face The Nation,” but the even stranger Viagra rape fiction made international headlines as U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice made a formal charge against Libya in front of the UN Security Council.
What this new email confirms is that not only was the State Department aware of the spurious nature of what Blumenthal calls “rumors” originating solely with the rebels, but did nothing to stop false information from rising to top officials who then gave them “credence.”
It appears, furthermore, that the Viagra mass rape hoax likely originated with Sidney Blumenthal himself.
Note
[1] The most comprehensive and well-documented study of the plight of black Libyans is contained in Slouching Towards Sirte: NATO’s War on Libya and Africa (publ. 2012, Baraka Books) by Maximilian Forte, Professor Anthropology and Sociology at Concordia University in Montréal, Québec.
This article was originally published at the Levant Report and has been used here with permission.
DOCUMENT 2
On Monday February 27th, 2012, WikiLeaks began publishing The Global Intelligence Files, over five million e-mails from the Texas headquartered "global intelligence" company Stratfor. The e-mails date between July 2004 and late December 2011. They reveal the inner workings of a company that fronts as an intelligence publisher, but provides confidential intelligence services to large corporations, such as Bhopal's Dow Chemical Co., Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and government agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security, the US Marines and the US Defence Intelligence Agency. The emails show Stratfor's web of informers, pay-off structure, payment laundering techniques and psychological methods.
INSIGHT - military intervention in Syria, post withdrawal status of forces
Released on 2012-03-06 07:00 GMT
Email-ID | 1671459 |
---|---|
Date | 2011-12-07 00:49:18 |
From | bhalla@stratfor.com |
To | secure@stratfor.com |
INSIGHT - military intervention in Syria, post withdrawal status of
forces
A few points I wanted to highlight from meetings today --
I spent most of the afternoon at the Pentagon with the USAF strategic
studies group - guys who spend their time trying to understand and explain
to the USAF chief the big picture in areas where they're operating in. It
was just myself and four other guys at the Lieutenant Colonel level,
including one French and one British representative who are liaising with
the US currently out of DC.
They wanted to grill me on the strategic picture on Syria, so after that I
got to grill them on the military picture. There is still a very low level
of understanding of what is actually at stake in Syria, what's the
strategic interest there, the Turkish role, the Iranian role, etc. After a
couple hours of talking, they said without saying that SOF teams
(presumably from US, UK, France, Jordan, Turkey) are already on the ground
focused on recce missions and training opposition forces. One Air Force
intel guy (US) said very carefully that there isn't much of a Free Syrian
Army to train right now anyway, but all the operations being done now are
being done out of 'prudence.' The way it was put to me was, 'look at this
way - the level of information known on Syrian OrBat this month is the
best it's been since 2001.' They have been told to prepare contingencies
and be ready to act within 2-3 months, but they still stress that this is
all being done as contingency planning, not as a move toward escalation.
I kept pressing on the question of what these SOF teams would be working
toward, and whether this would lead to an eventual air camapign to give a
Syrian rebel group cover. They pretty quickly distanced themselves from
that idea, saying that the idea 'hypothetically' is to commit guerrilla
attacks, assassination campaigns, try to break the back of the Alawite
forces, elicit collapse from within. There wouldn't be a need for air
cover, and they wouldn't expect these Syrian rebels to be marching in
columns anyway.
They emphasized how the air campaign in Syria makes Libya look like a
piece of cake. Syrian air defenses are a lot more robust and are much
denser, esp around Damascus and on the borders with Israel, Turkey. THey
are most worried about mobile air defenses, particularly the SA-17s that
they've been getting recently. It's still a doable mission, it's just not
an easy one.
The main base they would use is Cyprus, hands down. Brits and FRench would
fly out of there. They kept stressing how much is stored at Cyprus and how
much recce comes out of there. The group was split on whether Turkey would
be involved, but said Turkey would be pretty critical to the mission to
base stuff out of there. EVen if Turkey had a poltiical problem with
Cyprus, they said there is no way the Brits and the FRench wouldn't use
Cyprus as their main air force base. Air Force Intel guy seems pretty
convinced that the Turks won't participate (he seemed pretty pissed at
them.)
There still seems to be a lot of confusion over what a military
intervention involving an air campaign would be designed to achieve. It
isn't clear cut for them geographically like in Libya, and you can't just
create an NFZ over Homs, Hama region. This would entail a countrywide SEAD
campaign lasting the duration of the war. They dont believe air
intervention would happen unless there was enough media attention on a
massacre, like the Ghadafi move against Benghazi. They think the US would
have a high tolerance for killings as long as it doesn't reach that very
public stage. Theyre also questiioning the skills of the Syrian forces
that are operating the country's air defenses currently and how
signfiicant the Iranian presence is there. Air Force Intel guy is most
obsessed with the challenge of taking out Syria's ballistic missile
capabilities and chem weapons. With Israel rgiht there and the regime
facing an existential crisis, he sees that as a major complication to any
military intervention.
The post 2011 SOFA with Iraq is still being negotiated. These guys were
hoping that during Biden's visit that he would announce a deal with
Maliki, but no such luck. They are gambling ont he idea that the Iraqis
remember the iran-iraq war and that maliki is not going to want to face
the threat of Iranian jets entering Iraqi air space. THey say that most
US fighter jets are already out of Iraq and transferred to Kuwait. They
explained that's the beauty of the air force, the base in Kuwait is just a
hop, skip and jump away from their bases in Europe, ie. very easy to
rapidly build up when they need to. They don't seem concerned about the
US ability to restructure its forces to send a message to Iran. They gave
the example of the USS Enterprise that was supposed to be out of
commission already and got extended another couple years to send to the
gulf. WHen the US withdraws, we'll have at least 2 carriers in the gulf
out of centcom and one carrier in the Med out of EuCom. I asked if the
build-up in Kuwait and the carrier deployments are going to be enough to
send a message to Iran that the US isn't going anywhere. They responded
that Iran will get the message if they read the Centcom Web Site. STarting
Jan. 1 expect them to be publishing all over the place where the US is
building up.
Another concern they have about an operation in Syria is whether Iran
could impede operations out of Balad air force base in Iraq.
The French representative was of hte opinion that Syria won't be a
libya-type situation in that France would be gung-ho about going in. Not
in an election year. The UK rep also emphasized UK reluctance but said
that the renegotiation of the EU treaty undermines the UK role and that UK
would be looking for ways to reassert itself on the continent ( i dont
really think a syria campaign is the way to do that.) UK guy mentioned as
an aside that the air force base commander at Cyprus got switched out from
a maintenance guy to a guy that flew Raptors, ie someone that understands
what it means to start dropping bombs. He joked that it was probably a
coincidence.
Prior to that, I had a meeting with an incoming Kuwaiti diplomat (will be
coded as KU301.) His father was high up in the regime, always by the
CP's/PM's side. The diplo himself still seems to be getting his feet wet
in DC (the new team just arrived less than 2 weeks ago,) but he made
pretty clear that Kuwait was opening the door to allowing US to build up
forces as needed. THey already have a significant presence there, and a
lot of them will be on 90-day rotations. He also said that the SOFA that
the US signs with Baghdad at the last minute will be worded in such a way
that even allowing one trainer in the country can be construed to mean
what the US wants in terms of keeping forces in Iraq. Overall, I didnt get
the impression from him that Kuwait is freaked out about the US leaving.
Everyhting is just getting rearranged. The Kuwaitis used to be much
better at managing their relations with Iran, but ever since that spy ring
story came out a year ago, it's been bad. He doesn't think Iran has
significant covert capabililiteis in the GCC states, though they are
trying. Iranian activity is mostly propaganda focused. He said that while
KSA and Bahrain they can deal with it as needed and black out the media,
Kuwait is a lot more open and thus provides Iran with more oppotunity to
shape perceptions (he used to work in inforamtion unit in Kuwait.) He says
there is a sig number of kuwaitis that listen to Iranian media like Al
Alam especially.
On the Kuwaiti political scene - the government is having a harder time
dealing with a more emboldened opposition, but the opposition is still
extremely divided, esp among the Islamists. The MPs now all have to go
back to their tribes to rally support for the elections to take place in
Feb. Oftentimes an MP in Kuwait city will find out that he has lost
support back home with the tribe, and so a lot of moeny is handed out.The
govt is hoping that witha clean slate they can quiet the opposition down.
A good way of managing the opposition he said is to refer cases to the
courts, where they can linger forever. good way for the govt to buy time.
He doesnt believe the Arab League will take significant action against
Syria - no one is interested in military intervention. they just say it to
threaten it.
forces
A few points I wanted to highlight from meetings today --
I spent most of the afternoon at the Pentagon with the USAF strategic
studies group - guys who spend their time trying to understand and explain
to the USAF chief the big picture in areas where they're operating in. It
was just myself and four other guys at the Lieutenant Colonel level,
including one French and one British representative who are liaising with
the US currently out of DC.
They wanted to grill me on the strategic picture on Syria, so after that I
got to grill them on the military picture. There is still a very low level
of understanding of what is actually at stake in Syria, what's the
strategic interest there, the Turkish role, the Iranian role, etc. After a
couple hours of talking, they said without saying that SOF teams
(presumably from US, UK, France, Jordan, Turkey) are already on the ground
focused on recce missions and training opposition forces. One Air Force
intel guy (US) said very carefully that there isn't much of a Free Syrian
Army to train right now anyway, but all the operations being done now are
being done out of 'prudence.' The way it was put to me was, 'look at this
way - the level of information known on Syrian OrBat this month is the
best it's been since 2001.' They have been told to prepare contingencies
and be ready to act within 2-3 months, but they still stress that this is
all being done as contingency planning, not as a move toward escalation.
I kept pressing on the question of what these SOF teams would be working
toward, and whether this would lead to an eventual air camapign to give a
Syrian rebel group cover. They pretty quickly distanced themselves from
that idea, saying that the idea 'hypothetically' is to commit guerrilla
attacks, assassination campaigns, try to break the back of the Alawite
forces, elicit collapse from within. There wouldn't be a need for air
cover, and they wouldn't expect these Syrian rebels to be marching in
columns anyway.
They emphasized how the air campaign in Syria makes Libya look like a
piece of cake. Syrian air defenses are a lot more robust and are much
denser, esp around Damascus and on the borders with Israel, Turkey. THey
are most worried about mobile air defenses, particularly the SA-17s that
they've been getting recently. It's still a doable mission, it's just not
an easy one.
The main base they would use is Cyprus, hands down. Brits and FRench would
fly out of there. They kept stressing how much is stored at Cyprus and how
much recce comes out of there. The group was split on whether Turkey would
be involved, but said Turkey would be pretty critical to the mission to
base stuff out of there. EVen if Turkey had a poltiical problem with
Cyprus, they said there is no way the Brits and the FRench wouldn't use
Cyprus as their main air force base. Air Force Intel guy seems pretty
convinced that the Turks won't participate (he seemed pretty pissed at
them.)
There still seems to be a lot of confusion over what a military
intervention involving an air campaign would be designed to achieve. It
isn't clear cut for them geographically like in Libya, and you can't just
create an NFZ over Homs, Hama region. This would entail a countrywide SEAD
campaign lasting the duration of the war. They dont believe air
intervention would happen unless there was enough media attention on a
massacre, like the Ghadafi move against Benghazi. They think the US would
have a high tolerance for killings as long as it doesn't reach that very
public stage. Theyre also questiioning the skills of the Syrian forces
that are operating the country's air defenses currently and how
signfiicant the Iranian presence is there. Air Force Intel guy is most
obsessed with the challenge of taking out Syria's ballistic missile
capabilities and chem weapons. With Israel rgiht there and the regime
facing an existential crisis, he sees that as a major complication to any
military intervention.
The post 2011 SOFA with Iraq is still being negotiated. These guys were
hoping that during Biden's visit that he would announce a deal with
Maliki, but no such luck. They are gambling ont he idea that the Iraqis
remember the iran-iraq war and that maliki is not going to want to face
the threat of Iranian jets entering Iraqi air space. THey say that most
US fighter jets are already out of Iraq and transferred to Kuwait. They
explained that's the beauty of the air force, the base in Kuwait is just a
hop, skip and jump away from their bases in Europe, ie. very easy to
rapidly build up when they need to. They don't seem concerned about the
US ability to restructure its forces to send a message to Iran. They gave
the example of the USS Enterprise that was supposed to be out of
commission already and got extended another couple years to send to the
gulf. WHen the US withdraws, we'll have at least 2 carriers in the gulf
out of centcom and one carrier in the Med out of EuCom. I asked if the
build-up in Kuwait and the carrier deployments are going to be enough to
send a message to Iran that the US isn't going anywhere. They responded
that Iran will get the message if they read the Centcom Web Site. STarting
Jan. 1 expect them to be publishing all over the place where the US is
building up.
Another concern they have about an operation in Syria is whether Iran
could impede operations out of Balad air force base in Iraq.
The French representative was of hte opinion that Syria won't be a
libya-type situation in that France would be gung-ho about going in. Not
in an election year. The UK rep also emphasized UK reluctance but said
that the renegotiation of the EU treaty undermines the UK role and that UK
would be looking for ways to reassert itself on the continent ( i dont
really think a syria campaign is the way to do that.) UK guy mentioned as
an aside that the air force base commander at Cyprus got switched out from
a maintenance guy to a guy that flew Raptors, ie someone that understands
what it means to start dropping bombs. He joked that it was probably a
coincidence.
Prior to that, I had a meeting with an incoming Kuwaiti diplomat (will be
coded as KU301.) His father was high up in the regime, always by the
CP's/PM's side. The diplo himself still seems to be getting his feet wet
in DC (the new team just arrived less than 2 weeks ago,) but he made
pretty clear that Kuwait was opening the door to allowing US to build up
forces as needed. THey already have a significant presence there, and a
lot of them will be on 90-day rotations. He also said that the SOFA that
the US signs with Baghdad at the last minute will be worded in such a way
that even allowing one trainer in the country can be construed to mean
what the US wants in terms of keeping forces in Iraq. Overall, I didnt get
the impression from him that Kuwait is freaked out about the US leaving.
Everyhting is just getting rearranged. The Kuwaitis used to be much
better at managing their relations with Iran, but ever since that spy ring
story came out a year ago, it's been bad. He doesn't think Iran has
significant covert capabililiteis in the GCC states, though they are
trying. Iranian activity is mostly propaganda focused. He said that while
KSA and Bahrain they can deal with it as needed and black out the media,
Kuwait is a lot more open and thus provides Iran with more oppotunity to
shape perceptions (he used to work in inforamtion unit in Kuwait.) He says
there is a sig number of kuwaitis that listen to Iranian media like Al
Alam especially.
On the Kuwaiti political scene - the government is having a harder time
dealing with a more emboldened opposition, but the opposition is still
extremely divided, esp among the Islamists. The MPs now all have to go
back to their tribes to rally support for the elections to take place in
Feb. Oftentimes an MP in Kuwait city will find out that he has lost
support back home with the tribe, and so a lot of moeny is handed out.The
govt is hoping that witha clean slate they can quiet the opposition down.
A good way of managing the opposition he said is to refer cases to the
courts, where they can linger forever. good way for the govt to buy time.
He doesnt believe the Arab League will take significant action against
Syria - no one is interested in military intervention. they just say it to
threaten it.
DOCUMENT 3
Newly Translated WikiLeaks Saudi Cable: Overthrow the Syrian Regime, but Play Nice with Russia
An internal Saudi government cable sheds new light on its current threats of military escalation in Syria.
It is no secret that Saudi Arabia, along with its Gulf and Western allies, has played a direct role in fueling the fires of grinding sectarian conflict that has kept Syria burning for the past five years. It is also no secret that Russian intervention has radically altered the kingdom’s “regime change” calculus in effect since at least 2011. But an internal Saudi government cable sheds new light on the kingdom’s current threats of military escalation in Syria.
Overthrow the Regime “by all means available”
A WikiLeaks cable released as part of “The Saudi Cables” in the summer of 2015, now fully translated here for the first time, reveals what the Saudis feared most in the early years of the war: Russian military intervention and Syrian retaliation. These fears were such that the kingdom directed its media “not to oppose Russian figures and to avoid insulting them” at the time.
Saudi Arabia had further miscalculated that the “Russian position” of preserving the Assad government “will not persist in force.” In Saudi thinking, reflected in the leaked memo, Assad’s violent ouster (“by all means available”) could be pursued so long as Russia stayed on the sidelines. The following section is categorical in its emphasis on regime change at all costs, even should the U.S. vacillate for “lack of desire”:
“The fact must be stressed that in the case where the Syrian regime is able to pass through its current crisis in any shape or form, the primary goal that it will pursue is taking revenge on the countries that stood against it, with the Kingdom and some of the countries of the Gulf coming at the top of the list. If we take into account the extent of this regime’s brutality and viciousness and its lack of hesitancy to resort to any means to realize its aims, then the situation will reach a high degree of danger for the Kingdom, which must seek by all means available and all possible ways to overthrow the current regime in Syria. As regards the international position, it is clear that there is a lack of ‘desire’ and not a lack of ‘capability’ on the part of Western countries, chief among them the United States, to take firm steps…”
Amman-based Albawaba News—one of the largest online news providers in the Middle East—was the first to call attention to the WikiLeaks memo, which “reveals Saudi officials saying President Bashar al-Assad must be taken down before he exacts revenge on Saudi Arabia.” Albawaba offered a brief partial translation of the cable, which though undated, was likely produced in early 2012 (based on my best speculation using event references in the text; Russia began proposing informal Syrian peace talks in January 2012).
Russian Hardware, a Saudi Nightmare
Over the past weeks Saudi Arabia has ratcheted up its rhetoric on Syria, threatening direct military escalation and the insertion of special forces on the ground, ostensibly for humanitarian and stabilizing purposes as a willing partner in the “war on terror.” As many pundits are now observing, in reality the kingdom’s saber rattling stems not from confidence, but utter desperation as its proxy anti-Assad fighters face defeat by overwhelming Russian air power and Syrian ground forces, and as the Saudi military itself is increasingly bogged down in Yemen.
Even as the Saudi regime dresses its bellicose rhetoric in humanitarian terms, it ultimately desires to protect the flow of foreign fighters into Northern Syria, which is its still hoped-for “available means” of toppling the Syrian government (or at least, at this point, permanent sectarian partition of Syria).
The U.S. State Department’s own 2014 Country Report on Terrorismconfirms that the rate of foreign terrorist entry into Syria over the past few years is unprecedented among any conflict in history: “The rate of foreign terrorist fighter travel to Syria – totaling more than 16,000 foreign terrorist fighters from more than 90 countries as of late December – exceeded the rate of foreign terrorist fighters who traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, or Somalia at any point in the last 20 years.”
According to Cinan Siddi, Director of the Institute for Turkish Studies at Georgetown’s prestigious School of Foreign Service, Russian military presence in Syria was born of genuine geopolitical interests. In a public lecture recently given at Baylor University, Siddi said that Russia is fundamentally trying to disrupt the “jihadi corridor” facilitated by Turkey and its allies in Northern Syria.
The below leaked document gives us a glimpse into Saudi motives and fears long before Russian hardware entered the equation, and the degree to which the kingdom utterly failed in assessing Russian red lines.
For the first time, here’s a full translation of the text
THE BELOW original translation is courtesy of my co-author, a published scholar of Arabic and Middle East History, who wishes to remain unnamed. Note: the cable as published in the SaudiLeaks trove appears to be incomplete.
[…] shared interest, and believes that the current Russian position only represents a movement to put pressure on him, its goals being evident, and that this position will not persist in force, given Russia’s ties to interests with Western countries and the countries of the Gulf.
If it pleases Your Highness, I support the idea of entering into a profound dialogue with Russia regarding its position towards Syria*, holding the Second Strategic Conference in Moscow, working to focus the discussion during it on the issue of Syria, and exerting whatever pressure is possible to dissuade it from its current position. I likewise see an opportunity to invite the head of the Committee for International Relations in the Duma to visit the Kingdom. Since it is better to remain in communication with Russia and to direct the media not to oppose Russian figures and to avoid insulting them, so that no harm may come to the interests of the Kingdom, it is possible that the new Russian president will change Russian policy toward Arab countries for the better. However, our position currently in practice, which is to criticize Russian policy toward Syria and its positions that are contrary to our declared principles, remains. It is also advantageous to increase pressure on the Russians by encouraging the Organization of Islamic States to exert some form of pressure by strongly brandishing Islamic public opinion, since Russia fears the Islamic dimension more than the Arab dimension.
In what pertains to the Syrian crisis, the Kingdom is resolute in its position and there is no longer any room to back down. The fact must be stressed that in the case where the Syrian regime is able to pass through its current crisis in any shape or form, the primary goal that it will pursue is taking revenge on the countries that stood against it, with the Kingdom and some of the countries of the Gulf coming at the top of the list. If we take into account the extent of this regime’s brutality and viciousness and its lack of hesitancy to resort to any means to realize its aims, then the situation will reach a high degree of danger for the Kingdom, which must seek by all means available and all possible ways to overthrow the current regime in Syria.
As regards the international position, it is clear that there is a lack of “desire” and not a lack of “capability” on the part of Western countries, chief among them the United States, to take firm steps […]
*[in the Arabic text: Russia, but this is a typo]
This article was originally published at The Levant Report and has been used here with permission.
DOCUMENT 4
INFLUENCING THE SARG IN THE END OF 2006 | |
2006 December 13, 16:03 (Wednesday)
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1. (S) Summary. The SARG ends 2006 in a much stronger
position domestically and internationally than it did 2005.
While there may be additional bilateral or multilateral
pressure that can impact Syria, the regime is based on a
small clique that is largely immune to such pressure.
However, Bashar Asad's growing self-confidence )- and
reliance on this small clique -- could lead him to make
mistakes and ill-judged policy decisions through trademark
emotional reactions to challenges, providing us with new
opportunities. For example, Bashar,s reaction to the
prospect of Hariri tribunal and to publicity for Khaddam and
the National Salvation Front borders on the irrational.
Additionally, Bashar,s reported preoccupation with his image
and how he is perceived internationally is a potential
liability in his decision making process. We believe
Bashar,s weaknesses are in how he chooses to react to
looming issues, both perceived and real, such as a the
conflict between economic reform steps (however limited) and
entrenched, corrupt forces, the Kurdish question, and the
potential threat to the regime from the increasing presence
of transiting Islamist extremists. This cable summarizes our
assessment of these vulnerabilities and suggests that there
may be actions, statements, and signals that the USG can send
that will improve the likelihood of such opportunities
arising. These proposals will need to be fleshed out and
converted into real actions and we need to be ready to move
quickly to take advantage of such opportunities. Many of our
suggestions underline using Public Diplomacy and more
indirect means to send messages that influence the inner
circle. End Summary.
2. (S) As the end of 2006 approaches, Bashar appears in some
ways stronger than he has in two years. The country is
economically stable (at least for the short term), internal
opposition the regime faces is weak and intimidated, and
regional issues seem to be going Syria,s way, from
Damascus, perspective. Nonetheless, there are some
long-standing vulnerabilities and looming issues that may
provide opportunities to up the pressure on Bashar and his
inner circle. Regime decision-making is limited to Bashar
and an inner circle that often produces poorly thought-out
tactical decisions and sometimes emotional approaches, such
as Bashar,s universally derided August 15 speech. Some of
these vulnerabilities, such as the regime,s near-irrational
views on Lebanon, can be exploited to put pressure on the
regime. Actions that cause Bashar to lose balance and
increase his insecurity are in our interest because his
inexperience and his regime,s extremely small
decision-making circle make him prone to diplomatic stumbles
that can weaken him domestically and regionally. While the
consequences of his mistakes are hard to predict and the
benefits may vary, if we are prepared to move quickly to take
advantage of the opportunities that may open up, we may
directly impact regime behavior where it matters--Bashar and
his inner circle.
3. (S) The following provides our summary of potential
vulnerabilities and possible means to exploit them:
-- Vulnerability:
-- THE HARIRI INVESTIGATION AND THE TRIBUNAL: The Hariri
investigation ) and the prospect of a Lebanon Tribunal --
has provoked powerful SARG reactions, primarily because of
the embarrassment the investigation causes. Rationally, the
regime should calculate that it can deal with any summons of
Syrian officials by refusing to turn any suspects over, or,
in extreme cases by engineering "suicides.8 But it seems
the real issue for Bashar is that Syria,s dignity and its
international reputation are put in question. Fiercely-held
sentiments that Syria should continue to exercise dominant
control in Lebanon play into these sensitivities. We should
seek to exploit this raw nerve, without waiting for formation
of the tribunal.
-- Possible action:
-- PUBLICITY: Publicly highlighting the consequences of the
ongoing investigation a la Mehlis causes Bashar personal
DAMASCUS 00005399 002 OF 004
angst and may lead him to act irrationally. The regime has
deep-seated fears about the international scrutiny that a
tribunal -- or Brammertz accusations even against
lower-echelon figures -- would prompt. The Mehlis
accusations of October 2005 caused the most serious strains
in Bashar's inner circle. While the family got back
together, these splits may lie just below the surface.
-- Vulnerability:
-- THE ALLIANCE WITH TEHRAN: Bashar is walking a fine line in
his increasingly strong relations with Iran, seeking
necessary support while not completely alienating Syria,s
moderate Sunni Arab neighbors by being perceived as aiding
Persian and fundamentalist Shia interests. Bashar's decision
to not attend the Talabani ) Ahmadinejad summit in Tehran
following FM Moallem,s trip to Iraq can be seen as a
manifestation of Bashar's sensitivity to the Arab optic on
his Iranian alliance.
-- Possible action:
-- PLAY ON SUNNI FEARS OF IRANIAN INFLUENCE: There are fears
in Syria that the Iranians are active in both Shia
proselytizing and conversion of, mostly poor, Sunnis. Though
often exaggerated, such fears reflect an element of the Sunni
community in Syria that is increasingly upset by and focused
on the spread of Iranian influence in their country through
activities ranging from mosque construction to business.
Both the local Egyptian and Saudi missions here, (as well as
prominent Syrian Sunni religious leaders), are giving
increasing attention to the matter and we should coordinate
more closely with their governments on ways to better
publicize and focus regional attention on the issue.
-- Vulnerability:
-- THE INNER CIRCLE: At the end of the day, the regime is
dominated by the Asad family and to a lesser degree by Bashar
Asad,s maternal family, the Makhlufs, with many family
members believe to be increasingly corrupt. The family, and
hangers on, as well as the larger Alawite sect, are not
immune to feuds and anti-regime conspiracies, as was evident
last year when intimates of various regime pillars (including
the Makhloufs) approached us about post-Bashar possibilities.
Corruption is a great divider and Bashar's inner circle is
subject to the usual feuds and squabbles related to graft and
corruption. For example, it is generally known that Maher
Asad is particularly corrupt and incorrigible. He has no
scruples in his feuds with family members or others. There
is also tremendous fear in the Alawite community about
retribution if the Sunni majority ever regains power.
-- Possible Action:
-- ADDITIONAL DESIGNATIONS: Targeted sanctions against regime
members and their intimates are generally welcomed by most
elements of Syrian society. But the way designations are
applied must exploit fissures and render the inner circle
weaker rather than drive its members closer together. The
designation of Shawkat caused him some personal irritation
and was the subject of considerable discussion in the
business community here. While the public reaction to
corruption tends to be muted, continued reminders of
corruption in the inner circle have resonance. We should
look for ways to remind the public of our previous
designations.
-- Vulnerability:
-- THE KHADDAM FACTOR: Khaddam knows where the regime
skeletons are hidden, which provokes enormous irritation from
Bashar, vastly disproportionate to any support Khaddam has
within Syria. Bashar Asad personally, and his regime in
general, follow every news item involving Khaddam with
tremendous emotional interest. The regime reacts with
self-defeating anger whenever another Arab country hosts
Khaddam or allows him to make a public statement through any
of its media outlets.
-- Possible Action:
DAMASCUS 00005399 003 OF 004
-- We should continue to encourage the Saudis and others to
allow Khaddam access to their media outlets, providing him
with venues for airing the SARG,s dirty laundry. We should
anticipate an overreaction by the regime that will add to its
isolation and alienation from its Arab neighbors.
Vulnerability:
-- DIVISIONS IN THE MILITARY-SECURITY SERVICES: Bashar
constantly guards against challenges from those with ties
inside the military and security services. He is also
nervous about any loyalties senior officers (or former senior
officers) feel toward disaffected former regime elements like
Rif,at Asad and Khaddam. The inner circle focuses
continuously on who gets what piece of the corruption action.
Some moves by Bashar in narrowing the circle of those who
benefit from high-level graft has increased those with ties
to the security services who have axes to grind.
-- Possible Action:
-- ENCOURAGE RUMORS AND SIGNALS OF EXTERNAL PLOTTING:
The regime is intensely sensitive to rumors about
coup-plotting and restlessness in the security services and
military. Regional allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia should
be encouraged to meet with figures like Khaddam and Rif,at
Asad as a way of sending such signals, with appropriate
leaking of the meetings afterwards. This again touches on
this insular regime,s paranoia and increases the possibility
of a self-defeating over-reaction.
Vulnerability:
-- REFORM FORCES VERSUS BAATHISTS-OTHER CORRUPT ELITES:
Bashar keeps unveiling a steady stream of initiatives on
economic reform and it is certainly possible he believes this
issue is his legacy to Syria. While limited and ineffectual,
these steps have brought back Syrian expats to invest and
have created at least the illusion of increasing openness.
Finding ways to publicly call into question Bashar,s reform
efforts )- pointing, for example to the use of reform to
disguise cronyism -- would embarrass Bashar and undercut
these efforts to shore up his legitimacy. Revealing Asad
family/inner circle corruption would have a similar effect.
-- Possible Action:
-- HIGHLIGHTING FAILURES OF REFORM: Highlighting failures of
reform, especially in the run-up to the 2007 Presidential
elections, is a move that Bashar would find highly
embarrassing and de-legitimizing. Comparing and contrasting
puny Syrian reform efforts with the rest of the Middle East
would also embarrass and irritate Bashar.
-- Vulnerability:
-- THE ECONOMY: Perpetually under-performing, the Syrian
economy creates jobs for less than 50 percent of the
country,s university graduates. Oil accounts for 70 percent
of exports and 30 percent of government revenue, but
production is in steady decline. By 2010 Syria is expected
to become a net importer of oil. Few experts believe the
SARG is capable of managing successfully the expected
economic dislocations.
-- DISCOURAGE FDI, ESPECIALLY FROM THE GULF: Syria has
enjoyed a considerable up-tick in foreign direct investment
(FDI) in the last two years that appears to be picking up
steam. The most important new FDI is undoubtedly from the
Gulf.
-- Vulnerability:
-- THE KURDS: The most organized and daring political
opposition and civil society groups are among the ethnic
minority Kurds, concentrated in Syria,s northeast, as well
as in communities in Damascus and Aleppo. This group has
been willing to protest violently in its home territory when
others would dare not. There are few threats that loom
larger in Bashar,s mind than unrest with the Kurds. In what
DAMASCUS 00005399 004 OF 004
is a rare occurrence, our DATT was convoked by Syrian
Military Intelligence in May of 2006 to protest what the
Syrians believed were US efforts to provide military training
and equipment to the Kurds in Syria.
-- Possible Action:
-- HIGHLIGHT KURDISH COMPLAINTS: Highlighting Kurdish
complaints in public statements, including publicizing human
rights abuses will exacerbate regime,s concerns about the
Kurdish population. Focus on economic hardship in Kurdish
areas and the SARG,s long-standing refusal to offer
citizenship to some 200,000 stateless Kurds. This issue
would need to be handled carefully, since giving the wrong
kind of prominence to Kurdish issues in Syria could be a
liability for our efforts at uniting the opposition, given
Syrian (mostly Arab) civil society,s skepticism of Kurdish
objectives.
-- Vulnerability:
-- Extremist elements increasingly use Syria as a base, while
the SARG has taken some actions against groups stating links
to Al-Qaeda. With the killing of the al-Qaida leader on the
border with Lebanon in early December and the increasing
terrorist attacks inside Syria culminating in the September
12 attack against the US embassy, the SARG,s policies in
Iraq and support for terrorists elsewhere as well can be seen
to be coming home to roost.
-- Possible Actions:
-- Publicize presence of transiting (or externally focused)
extremist groups in Syria, not limited to mention of Hamas
and PIJ. Publicize Syrian efforts against extremist groups
in a way that suggests weakness, signs of instability, and
uncontrolled blowback. The SARG,s argument (usually used
after terror attacks in Syria) that it too is a victim of
terrorism should be used against it to give greater
prominence to increasing signs of instability within Syria.
4. (S) CONCLUSION: This analysis leaves out the anti-regime
Syrian Islamists because it is difficult to get an accurate
picture of the threat within Syria that such groups pose.
They are certainly a long-term threat. While it alludes to
the vulnerabilities that Syria faces because of its alliance
with Iran, it does not elaborate fully on this topic. The
bottom line is that Bashar is entering the new year in a
stronger position than he has been in several years, but
those strengths also carry with them -- or sometimes mask )
vulnerabilities. If we are ready to capitalize, they will
offer us opportunities to disrupt his decision-making, keep
him off-balance, and make him pay a premium for his mistakes.
ROEBUCK
DOCUMENT 5
H: NEW INTEL SYRIA, TURYKEY, ISRAEL, IRAN. SID
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05795336 Date: 01/07/2016
RELEASE IN PART
B6
Fyi.
CONFIDENTIAL
July 24, 2012
For: Hillary
SOURCE: Sources with access to the highest levels of the Governments and institutions discussed below. This includes
political parties and regional intelligence and security services.
1. According to an individual with access to the highest levels of major European governments, the
intelligence services of these countries are reporting to their principals that the commanders of the Israeli
military and intelligence community believe that the civil war in Syria is spreading to neighboring countries,
including Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey . These European officials are concerned that the ongoing conflict in
Syria will lead to uprisings in these countries that will bring increasingly conservative Islamic regimes into
power, replacing existing secular or moderate regimes. This individual adds that, Israeli security officials
believe that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is convinced that these developments will leave them
vulnerable, with only enemies on their borders.
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05795336 Date: 01/07/2016
2. In private conversations senior Israeli Intelligence and Military commaders state to their European
associates that they have long viewed the regime of Syrian President Bashar al Assad, while hostile, as a known
quantity and a buffer between Israel and the more militant Muslim countries, a situation that is threatened by the
growing successs of the rebel forces of the Free Syria Army (FSA). This source is convinced that these Israeli
leaders are now drawing up contingency plans to deal with a regional structure where the new revolutionary
regimes that take over the various countries will be controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood and possibly more
problematic groups such as al Qa'ida, which doesn't bode well for the Israelis.
3. At the same time, looking at the tensions between Israel and Iran as part of the overall situation in the
region, these European heads of state are receiving reporting indicating that if Israel were to attack the Iranian
nuclear facilities at this time it would only exacerbate relations with their neighbors. In addition, such an attack
may lead to further deterioration in the world economy, which would in turn be blamed on Israel. These sources
believe that such an attack would also unite the Iranian population against the United States and strengthen their
ties to the Mullahs, rather than weaken them. These particular individuals fear that this in turn would accelerate
Iranian efforts at building a nuclear arsenal, seeking additional support from their contacts in Russia and China.
4. According to a source with direct access, Turkish Army commanders have stated in private
discussions with the highest levels of their Government that an Israeli attack on Iran will surely start a regional
war "before the first Israel air-strike sortie has returned to base". Turkish intelligence estimates, supported by
their liaison contacts in Western European intelligence services, advise that thousands of missiles and rockets
would fall on Israel fired from Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza.
5. (Source Comment: The Turkish Army estimates that Syria and Lebanon Hezbollah forces have
access to over 200,000 surface to surface rockets and missiles. Their military analysts also believe that an
assault from such a force would overwhelm Israel's defenses.)
6. According to these individuals, the European intelligence sources are also advising their heads of
state that international economic sanctions are truly hurting the Iranian economy and have begun to foster
frustration among the Iranian people. Sources in Tehran report that this hostility is increasingly aimed at the
ruling party. These indivdivals also advise that an Israeli attack against Iran would immediately serve to
undermine this situation, turning the populaton against Israel, the United States, and Western Europe in support
of their rulers, both Islamic and Secular. In this regard, these European security leaders regularly site the words
of Prime Minister Netanyahu: "Iran in particular is susceptible to economic pressure. The oil-exporting Islamic
republic is virtually a single-crop economy, and imposition of a tight blockade against Iranian oil sales will
undoubtedly induce in Teheran a prompt revaluation of the utility of even indirect terrorist tactics."
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05795336 Date: 01/07/2016
7. One particular source states that the British and French Intelligence services believe that their Israeli
counterparts are convinced that there is a positive side to the civil war in Syria; if the Assad regime topples, Iran
would lose its only ally in the Middle East and would be isolated. At the same time, the fall of the House of
Assad could well ignite a sectarian war between the Shiites and the majority Sunnis of the region drawing in
Iran, which, in the view of Israeli commaders would not be a bad thing for Israel and its Western allies. In the
opinion of this individual, such a scenario would distract and might obstruct Iran from its nuclear activities for a
good deal of time. In addition, certain senior Israeli intelligence analysts believe that this turn of events may
even prove to be a factor in the eventual fall of the current government of Iran.
8. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this particularly sensitive source, after discussions with Israeli
contacts, if you consider Israel's position at this juncture, with all that is ongoing in the region, what position
would you take? At present, considering that Israel is not prepared for an all out war with Iran, they may well
continue to threaten action, giving the impression they are serious about pursuing aggresive Iranian anti-nuclear
efforts. One way to do that is to update weapon systems; secure an air base in Saudi Arabia that would suggest a
staging ground for an eventual attack, then "leak" the word to the media that their are eminent plans to carry out
a bombing raid and do everything possible to persuade the world they mean business.)
9. At the same time, a separate sensitive source added that the European security services are concerned
that this brinksmanship could lead to missteps that could, in turn, lead to a regional war. In this regard these
European services are staying in close contact with their Israeli counterparts as they attempt to manipulate
events while avoiding a general conflict at this time. This individual stated that a senior Israeli military
commander described the current situation from the Israeli perspective by quoting Sun Tzu wrote in THE ART
OF WAR: "He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight."
CONFIDENTIAL: This message is confidential, privileged, and is covered by the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (18 USC 2510). This message and any attachments are intended for the sole use of the addresses(s)
and any discussion, copying and/or distribution is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error,
please notify the sender, and immediately delete from your computer system. Thank you.
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05795336 Date: 01/07/2016
CONFIDENTIAL/PROPRIETARY
DOCUMENT 6
SPOT REPORT 02/12/II
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05789138 Date: 10/30/2015
RELEASE IN FULL
See last item - AQ is on our side in Syria.
Otherwise, things have basically turned out as expected.
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Operations Center
SPOT REPORT
Syria Update
Sunday, February 12, 2012
1530 EST
ARAB LEAGUE RESOLUTION ON SYRIA
• (U) Syria rejected a resolution issued by Arab League (AL) foreign ministers, which requested the UNSC
create a joint UN-AL peacekeeping mission for Syria and demanded an immediate cease-fire. The resolution
further called for the AL to end its current observer mission, tighten economic sanctions, halt diplomatic
cooperation with the Syrian government, and provide political and material support to the Syrian
opposition. (Reuters)
• (SBU) Embassy Cairo comments AL SYG al-Araby said he received a letter from Russian Foreign Minister
Lavrov indicating Russia supports a cease-fire and would support sending monitors under UN-AL auspices,
provided Syria approved the countries contributing monitors.ps/Embassy Cairo e -mail)
• (U) Tunisian Foreign Minister Abdel Salam announced Tunisia would host a February 24 "Friends of Syria"
meeting. Qatari Prime Minister al-Thani welcomed Tunisia's announcement and said it would be a good
opportunity to create clear international direction to help the Syrian people emerge from the crisis.s)
• (SBU) Embassy Cairo comments Saudi Foreign Minister al-Faisal called on the AL to open communications
with the Syrian oppoSition and provide assistance to the Syrian people.s/Embassy Cairo e -mail)
GCC ASKS AL -ARABY TO RECOGNIZE SNC
(SBU) Embassy Cairo comments the AL SYG reiterated during the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) meeting
his longstanding position Syrian National Council (SNC) recognition rests with individual Arab
states.(Ops/Embassy Cairo e-mail)
ATTACKS RESUME IN HOMS
(U) Sporadic rocket and gunfire killed at least four people in the Baba Amr neighborhood of Horns, following a
partial day's lull in violence. Syrian security forces permitted some families in mainly Sunni Muslim
opposition areas to leave.Reuters)
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05789138 Date: 10/30/2015
AL-ZAWAHIRI URGES MUSLIM SUPPORT FOR OPPOSITION
(U) Al-Qaida leader al-Zawahiri called on Muslims in Turkey and the Middle East to aid rebel forces in their
fight against supporters of Syrian President Asad in an interne video recording. Al-Zawahiri also urged the
Syrian people not to rely on the AL, Turkey, or the United States for assistance.euters)
Please see our classified website atttp://ses.state.sgov.gov
Drafted: AMSlack Approved: ABStorsve
Dist: State (all bureaus), NSS, OSD, NMCC, JCS, CIA, OSC, NCTC, DHS, DNI
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
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